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1 Introduction
This paper shows that behavioral heterogeneity can be the equilibrium out-
come of the strategic interaction of ex-ante identical, fully rational agents. We
analyze the phenomenon of equilibrium heterogeneity on the supply side of a
oligopolistic market, by assuming that technologically identical firms, compet-
ing à la Cournot, may adopt two types of market behavior: they may act on
the market as pure profit maximizers or rather as relative profit maximizers.
The type according to which firms behave on the market is optimally chosen
on the basis of profit maximizing objectives, and market interactions are mod-
eled as a multi-stage game in which the strategic choice of the type precedes
the choice of quantities. By allowing for the endogenous choice of motives, we
attribute to competing firms a rationality which may imply a deviation from
profit maximization at the market stage, when this ensures profit gains due to
the properties of strategic interaction.
Our work can be traced back to two broad and articulated research lines. The
first includes the vast and variegated literature which has critically questioned
the same idea that firms behave according to a profit maximization criterion;
the second concerns the individual and market performance in the presence of
heterogeneous firms.
Indeed, starting from the managerial theories of the firm,1 a large stream
of the economic literature has critically investigated the classical assumption
of profit maximization, by analyzing the circumstances under which alternative
modes of behavior are either more plausible, or conducive to higher absolute
profits, or able to guarantee a superior performance in the market. In particu-
lar, the optimality of a profit maximizing behavior has been challenged within
the Industrial Organization, evolutionary and experimental literature. The IO
research on strategic delegation (among others, Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and
Judd, 1987; Miller and Pazgal, 2002) has shown that in a game theoretical con-
text, managers concerned with maximizing revenues or relative performance can
be allowed by the firms’ owners to deviate from profit maximization. The dele-
gation to managers of non profit maximizing decisions represents a unilaterally
rational choice for the firms’ profit maximizing owners, since it allows to take
full advantage of the strategic interactions characterizing oligopolistic markets.
Delegation strategies also turn out to reconcile the owners’ profit maximization
goals with the utility maximization of managers. The idea of an endogenous
choice of motives also inspires the mixed duopoly model by Choi and Lu (2009),
who analyze the strategic choice of a public and a private firm to be concerned
with their relative or their absolute payoﬀ.
In an alternative microfoundation set-up, namely evolutionary game theory,
Schaﬀer (1989) demonstrates that absolute profit maximization does not ensure
1By focusing on the divergence of objectives due to the separation between ownership and
management and on the cognitive limits of firms, these theories (Cyert and March, 1963;
Marris, 1964; Williamson, 1964; Simon, 1955) consider firms as adaptively rational, rather
than optimizing entities, which pursue satisfactory performance objectives, which may include
sales or asset growth maximization.
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firms’ survival on the market, and that in this perspective the most successful
behavior is to be identified in the ability of firms to maximize their relative per-
formance. According to Schaﬀer, the Friedman’s conjecture (Friedman, 1953)
that profit maximization is required for survival, is conditional on the existence
of competitive markets, while it does not hold when firms enjoy market power,
as in a Cournot setting.
Non profit maximizing behavior in oligopolies is also supported by recent
experimental research in the field. Georgantzís et al. (2008) test experimentally
diﬀerent strategic delegation contracts, and provide comparative evidence on
the adoption of incentive schemes based on relative performance and on rev-
enues. Other experimental studies show that imitative or adaptive behavior
(Oﬀerman et al, 2002; Nagel and Vriend, 1999) can emerge in oligopolistic mar-
ket games in which firms are boundedly rational, with a limited perception of
the environment.
The eﬀects of behavioral heterogeneity in oligopolistic markets — and in
particular the coexistence of profit and relative profit maximizing firms — have
been analyzed by Riechmann (2006), who shows that in quantity competition
framework the equilibrium quantities and price reflect the relative weight of the
two types of firm, the Cournot and the Walrasian equilibrium emerging as limit
cases, as the fraction of profit maximizers moves from one to zero. In a similar
set-up, the comparative performance of behaviorally heterogeneous agents has
been studied by Huang (2002), who points out that the adoption of a simple
and naïve behavior (namely a price-taking rule) may lead to higher competitive
gains with respect to more sophisticated strategies. The interaction between
optimizers and imitators is studied, with analogous results, by Schipper (2009).
While optimizers play a best response to the rivals’ output choices at the earlier
round, the imitators follow the rule of producing the quantity chosen in the
previous period by the most profitable firm, thus mimicking the behavior of their
most successful rivals. By applying stochastic stability analysis in a dynamic
discrete-time setting which extends the work of Vega-Redondo (1997),2 Schipper
demonstrates a convergence to a set of states in which imitators perform better
than optimizers.
Our work tries to connect these research lines and to enrich their theoretical
scope. On the one hand, the literature on the microfoundation of non profit
maximizing behavior has always delivered symmetric equilibria, thus character-
ized by behavioral homogeneity. On the other hand, the research on the eﬀects
of heterogeneity has taken the latter as given, neglecting the issue of the agents’
individual incentives to maintain their assumed behavioral rule. Our aim is to
microfound heterogeneity, namely the coexistence of profit maximizers and rel-
ative profit maximizers, by showing that it characterizes deviation-proof stable
partitions of firms which play a non-cooperative game with respect to motives
and quantities. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly illustrates
some basic features of our set-up. In Sections 3 and 4 we analyze equilibrium
2This important work in evolutionary theory shows that the dynamic interactions of firms
which imitate the rivals’ success in a Cournot market result into a Walrasian competitive
equilibrium.
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heterogeneity in simultaneous and sequential game structures. An interpreta-
tion of the results is oﬀered is Section 5, while Section 6 gathers some final
remarks.
2 The strategic choice of behavioral rules
We consider a multi-stage game in the market for a homogeneous product, pop-
ulated by technologically identical firms which compete over quantities. All
firms have an ultimate objective in terms of profit maximization. However, in
order to pursue this objective, in a pre-market stage they have the possibility to
choose irrevocably the behavioral rule they will follow in their strategic choice
of quantities — in particular, to respond to the rivals’ quantity choices according
to either a profit maximizing, or a relative profit maximizing reaction function.
A possible interpretation of this sequence of decisions is in a strategic delega-
tion vein. We may think of firms’ profit maximizing owners delegating their
quantity decisions to two alternative types of managers — managers interested
in the absolute performance of the firm, or managers interested in its relative
performance.3 Delegation to a manager is indeed the simplest way to formalize
the commitment to a given type of behavior in the quantity stage.
In the next sections we shall study this type-quantity strategic choice in both
simultaneous and sequential game structures. In the simultaneous case we depict
a traditional two-stage game, in which all firms first choose simultaneously their
type, then simultaneously compete over quantities. As far as the sequential
game structures are concerned, we shall allow for sequential decisions either on
quantities only, or on both types and quantities. Our main interest is to verify
whether the equilibria of these games generate firms’ partitions across types
characterized by a behavioral heterogeneity. This would amount to showing that
once the behavioral rules enter the domain of strategic choices — i.e., they are
endogeneized according to a profit maximizing criterion — strategic interaction
may generate behavioral heterogeneity of otherwise identical firms.
All the games analyzed in the sequel are characterized by the following basic
common features. The inverse market demand function is linear and given by:
P = a−Q
where Q is the total quantity produced and sold. Moreover, in order to rule out
any exogenous or endogenous source of cost heterogeneity, we assume that all
firms produce at a constant average and marginal cost c.
3 The simultaneous game
Assume that the total number of firms is n ≥ 2. The structure of the game
is the following: at the first stage the firms choose simultaneously whether to
3For an interpretation of delegation choices in terms of the type of manager hired by firms,
see Miller and Pazgal, 2002.
4
behave as profit maximizers (PM) or as relative profit maximizers (RPM) at the
market stage; at the second stage they compete simultaneously over quantities,
consistently with the behavioral rule chosen at the first stage. As we clarified
above, we can interpret this framework as one in which owners choose a type
of manager at the first stage, and managers of possibly diﬀerent types compete
over quantities at the second stage. This two-stage game can be solved by
backward induction.
Assume that at the first stage k ≤ n firms (indexed with i) chose to be profit
maximizers, while the remaining n− k (indexed with j) decided to be relative
profit maximizers. The decisions taken at the first stage are common knowledge
at the second stage. The generic PM firm maximizes:
πi = (a− qi − Zi −Qj − c) qi
where Zi is the quantity produced by the other PM firms, and Qj is the quantity
produced by all the RPM ones. By solving this problem and imposing symmetry
over the k firms of type PM — Zi = (k − 1) qi — we obtain the following reaction
function:
qi =
a− c−Qj
k + 1 (1)
As far as the generic RPM firm is concerned, it maximizes the diﬀerence
between its profits and the average absolute profits of all firms:
Rj = πj −
Pk
i=1 πi +
Pn
r=k+1 πr
n =
n− 1
n πj −
Pk
i=1 πi +
Pn
r=k+1|r 6=j| πr
n
where
Pn
r=k+1 πr is the sum of the profits of the RPM firms. This amounts to
maximizing
Rj =
n− 1
n ((a−Qi − Zj − qj − c) qj) +
− 1n
Ã kX
i=1
((a−Qi − Zj − qj − c) qi) +
n−1X
r=k+1
((a−Qi − Zj − qj − c) qr)
!
where Zj is the quantity produced by the other RPM firms, and Qi is the quan-
tity produced by all the PM firms. The reaction function of the firm j, obtained
by imposing symmetry over the (n− k) RPM firms — Zj = (n− k − 1) qj — is
therefore:
qj =
(n− 2)Qi − (a− c) (n− 1)
(n− 2k + kn− n2) (2)
By substituting for Qj = (n− k) qj in (1) and Qi = kqi in (2), and solving
these two equations for qi and qj , we obtain the following equilibrium quantities:
q∗i =
(a− c) k
2k + n (n− 1)
q∗j =
(a− c) (k + n− 1)
2k + n (n− 1)
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which clearly show that RPM firms produce a larger quantity, thus earning
higher profits. In particular, the profits accruing to the two types of firms are:
π∗i = (a− kq∗i − (n− k) q∗j − c)q∗i =
(a− c)2 k2
(2k + n (n− 1))2
(3)
π∗j = (a− kq∗i − (n− k) q∗j − c)q∗j =
k (a− c)2 (k + n− 1)
(2k + n (n− 1))2
(4)
This is the solution of the second stage, associated to a generic partition
in k PM and (n− k) RPM firms. In order to find the equilibria of the two-
stage game, we have to identify those partitions which are indeed ‘deviation-
proof’ at the first stage, i.e. partitions which no firm has the incentive to
unilaterally deviate from, when choosing its type. A partition is an equilibrium
if neither a PM nor a RPM firm perceives the unilateral incentive to commit to
the alternative behavioral rule. A firm decides to deviate from a given partition,
if the profits it gains by committing to the alternative type are higher than those
associated to that partition.
Accordingly, the following proposition can be established.
Proposition 1 In a simultaneous, two-stage ’type-quantity’ game, the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by one firm behaving as profit max-
imizer, and n− 1 firms behaving as relative profit maximizers.
Proof. Starting from a generic partition, let us first consider the incentive
to deviate for a RPM firm. Since the deviation would be observed by all the
deviating firm’s competitors, the latter will take it into account in their quantity
optimization procedures. This implies that the profits of the deviating firm
would be
πDi =
(a− c)2 (k + 1)2
(2 (k + 1) + n (n− 1))2
which is simply (3) re-calculated under the hypothesis that PM firms are now
k+1. It can be checked that for all n, πDi > π∗j only if k = 0. The only partition
of firms from which a RPM firm deviates is that in which all firms are RPM. All
partitions with k > 0 are deviation-proof for RPM agents. The same procedure
can be applied to evaluate the incentive to deviate of a PM firm. By turning
into a RPM firm, it would obtain:
πdj =
(a− c)2 (k + n− 2) (k − 1)
(2 (k − 1) + n (n− 1))2
which is equation (4) re-calculated under the hypothesis that the PM firms are
now k−1. The comparison between πdj and π∗i shows that for any value of n, the
only partition which is ‘deviation-proof’ for PM firms is that associated with
k = 1, i.e. with only one PM firm operating at the quantity stage. Therefore
k = 1 is the only equilibrium partition.
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This outcome is not surprising, once we recall that were the market popu-
lated by RPM firms only, competition would lead to a Walrasian outcome (if
k = 0, π∗j = 0 in (4)). In the above two-stage game, behavioral heterogeneity
has an intuitive explanation: for a RPM behavior to be profitable, there must
be a benchmark PM behavior to rely upon. Notice however that once PM firms
operate in the market, RPM firms obtain much higher profits than their PM
rivals — and this explains why the equilibrium partition is characterized by only
one PM firm, which exerts a large positive externality on its RPM competitors.
The idea that profitability of relative profit maximization requires a profit
maximizing benchmark suggests us to investigate behavioral heterogeneity in
more articulated market structures, which allow for sequential decisions.
4 The sequential games
When sequential decisions are introduced in the above game, two basic struc-
tures are to be investigated. In the first, sequential decisions are taken only
on quantities, while firms choose simultaneously whether to be PM or RPM.
In the second, we allow for sequential choices for both dimensions of the firms’
strategic interaction.
4.1 Simultaneous choice of types and sequential choice of
quantities
Consider a multi-stage version of the game with n ≥ 3 firms. At the market stage
firms compete sequentially on quantities, with one firm acting as first mover
(leader), and the remaining m = n − 1 firms (followers) taking simultaneously
their decisions after observing the first-mover quantity choice. All firms decide
on their quantities consistently with the type chosen simultaneously at the first
stage.
In order to solve the game by backward induction, we consider first the
quantity decisions of the followers. In analogy with the simultaneous game we
assume that k ≤ m followers (indexed with i) chose at the first stage to be PM,
and the remaining m − k (indexed with j) chose to be RPM. By maximizing
the objective functions of the PM and RPM followers, we obtain the following
reaction functions:
qi =
a− c− (m− k) qj − q0
k + 1
qj =
(a− c)m− (kqi + q0) (m− 1)
(k − km+m2 + 1)
where q0 denotes the quantity produced by the leader. Solving for qi and qj in
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terms of q0 yields
qi =
(a− c) (k + 1)− q0 (m+ 1)
2k +m2 + 1 (5)
qj =
(a− c) (k +m)− q0 (m− 1)
2k +m2 + 1 (6)
Accordingly, the followers’ profits in terms of q0 are
πi =
(q0 (m+ 1)− (a− c) (k + 1))2
(2k +m2 + 1)2
(7)
πj =
(q0 (m+ 1)− (a− c) (k + 1)) (q0 (m− 1)− (a− c) (k +m))
(2k +m2 + 1)2
(8)
The quantity produced by the leader clearly depends on its being PM or
RPM. A PM leader maximizes:
π0 = (a− q0 − kqi − (m− k)qj − c) q0 (9)
where qi and qj are given by (5) and (6), and its optimal quantity is4
qPM0 =
(k + 1) (a− c)
2 (m+ 1) (10)
By substituting (10) into (7), (8), and (9) we obtain the profits π which accrue
to the various firms in a market structure characterized by a PM quantity leader,
and by a generic partition with k PM and (m− k) RPM followers:
π0 =
1
4
(a− c)2 (k + 1)2
(2k +m2 + 1) (m+ 1)
πi =
1
4
(a− c)2 (k + 1)2
(2k +m2 + 1)2
πj =
1
4
(a− c)2
¡
3k +m+ km+ 2m2 + 1
¢
(k + 1)
(2k +m2 + 1)2 (m+ 1)
Alternatively, a RPM leader maximizes
R0 =
m
m+ 1π0 −
kπi + (m− k)πj
m+ 1
where πi, πj and π0 are given by (7), (8) and (9). The corresponding maximizing
quantity is therefore:
qRPM0 =
1
2
(a− c)
¡
3k + 2k2 + 2m2 + km2
¢
(2k +m2) (m+ 1) (11)
4Notice that q0 is increasing in k, since RPM agents are more aggressive than PM agents.
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By substituting (11) into (7), (8), and (9) we get the firms’ profits bπ asso-
ciated with the alternative market structure with a RPM quantity leader and
the above generic partition with k PM and m− k RPM followers:
bπ0 = 1
4
(a− c)2 k
¡
3k + 2k2 + 2m2 + km2
¢
(2k +m2)2 (m+ 1)
bπi = 1
4
(a− c)2 k2
(2k +m2)2
bπj = 1
4
(a− c)2 k
¡
3k + km+ 2m2
¢
(2k +m2)2 (m+ 1)
Again, the solution of the multi-stage game is a partition across types of the
population of firms, which is stable in the sense that neither the leader, nor the
followers perceive the incentive to unilaterally change their type, given the type
chosen by the others. The result is synthesized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In a ‘type-quantity’ game with simultaneous choice of types and
sequential choice of quantities the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is charac-
terized by the quantity leader behaving as profit maximizer, and all the followers
behaving as relative profit maximizers.
Proof. We proceed to identify the deviation-proof configurations in two steps.
First, for any given choice of the leader we identify the partitions of the followers
from which the latter have no incentive to deviate. With respect to these par-
titions we then check the incentives to deviate for the leader. Let us start from
the case in which the leader is a PM. Consider first the incentive to unilateral
deviation perceived by a RPM follower. By solving again the quantity stage of
the game under the hypothesis that there are now k+1 PM followers, we obtain
that the profits of the deviating firm would be:
πDi =
1
4
(a− c)2 (k + 2)2
(2k +m2 + 3)2
The comparison between πj and πDi shows that πj > πDi for all m and k < m:
with a PM leader, all partitions are deviation-proof for a RPM follower. As far
as PM followers are concerned, the profits they would earn in case of deviation
to a RPM behavior are given by:
πdj =
1
4
(a− c)2
¡
3k + km+ 2m2 − 2
¢
k
(2k +m2 − 1)2 (m+ 1)
It can be checked that πdj > πi for all m and k > 0: if the leader is PM, a PM
follower always finds it convenient to deviate and to become a RPM agent. We
can therefore establish that with a PM leader, the only stable partition of the
followers implies that all followers are RPM, i.e. k = 0.
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We now turn to the case in which the leader is a RPM. Following the same
procedure applied above, we find that the profits gained by a RPM follower
unilaterally deviating to a PM behavior are
bπDi = 14 (a− c)2 (k + 1)2(2k +m2 + 2)2
It is immediate to verify that bπDi < bπj for all m and k > 0. The incentive
to deviate arises only when k = 0: with a RPM leader, a deviation of a RPM
follower occurs only when in the market there are no PM firms. Consider now
the incentives of PM followers. If one of them deviated into a RPM behavior,
it would earn
bπdj = 14 (a− c)
2
(k − 1)
¡
3k −m+ km+ 2m2 − 3
¢
(2k +m2 − 2)2 (m+ 1)
A PM follower deviates if bπdj > bπi, which for all m occurs if k > 1: it always
deviates, unless it is the only PM firm active in the market. Therefore, if the
leader is a RPM the only stable configuration for the followers is the one in
which m− 1 of them are RPM, and only one behaves as PM.
Having identified the configurations which are stable from the followers’ per-
spective, we have now to check whether they are deviation-proof for the leader.
We start by considering the partition in which the quantity leader is RPM,m−1
followers are RPM and one follower is PM. In this configuration the quantity
leader’s profits are
bπ0|k=1| = 1
4
(a− c)2
¡
5 + 3m2
¢
(2 +m2)2 (m+ 1)
This expression must be compared with the profits in case of unilateral devia-
tion:
π0|k=1| =
(a− c)2
(3 +m2) (m+ 1)
Since π0|k=1| > bπ0|k=1| for all m, this partition is not stable and cannot be a
solution of the multi-stage game. In the alternative case, with a PM leader and
m RPM followers, the leader’s profits are
π0|k=0| =
1
4
(a− c)2
(m2 + 1) (m+ 1)
Should the leader unilaterally deviate from a PM to a RPM behavior, at the
quantity stage all firms would be RPM and the equilibrium profits would be
equal to zero for both the leader and the followers (bπ0|k=0| = bπj|k=0| = 0). Since
π0|k=0| > 0, this partition is overall stable. Therefore, the only equilibrium
partition is the one in which the leader is PM, while all followers are RPM
(k = 0). ¥
Notice that in this equilibrium configuration the profits earned by the RPM
followers are higher than those of the PM leader: π0|k=0| < πj|k=0|. Once we
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allow for a simultaneous choice of types, the advantages of being first-mover
at the quantity stage vanish: the leader takes up the role of the benchmark
profit maximizer, thus creating a proper environment for the aggressiveness of
its RPM followers.
4.2 Sequential choice of types and sequential choice of
quantities
In this section we study the equilibrium of a multi-stage game in which we allow
for sequentiality of decisions with respect to both the behavioral rules and the
quantity decisions.
In particular, the first case we analyze is characterized by the property that
all decisions upon types precede those upon quantities: the leader and the
followers choose sequentially their types; then the leader and the followers take
sequentially the quantity decisions. The key diﬀerence between this game and
the previous sequential game is that now the leader can take a commitment on
its type, which is irrevocable not only with respect to the quantity stage, but
also with respect to the choice of type of the followers. This implies that we can
identify its solution by simply comparing the profits which accrue to the leader
in the two market configurations which are deviation-proof for the followers: if
the leader is RPM, k = 1; if the leader is PM, k = 0. Since bπ0|k=1| > π0|k=0|, in
the sequential decision on types the leader will choose to be RPM. This leads
to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In a sequential ‘type-quantity’ game, where sequential decisions
on types take place before sequential decision on quantities, the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium entails a relative profit maximizing leader, and a partition of
followers with one profit maximizer and (m− 1) relative profit maximizers.
Once the quantity leader is given the opportunity of being first-mover also
on types, its optimal choice is to be RPM and to leave to (one of) the followers
the burden to be the benchmark profit maximizer. In this case the first mover
advantage at the quantity stage is fully recovered: bπ0|k=1| > bπj|k=1| > bπi|k=1|.
We finally consider the case in which both decisions of the leader — on type
and quantity — precede those of the followers. The leader, by formulating an ex-
pectation about the distribution of followers across types, takes a commitment
both on its type and on its quantity. Followers decide, given all choices of the
leader. A rational-expectation equilibrium is defined as a partition of the follow-
ers and a choice of type of the leader such that the partition is deviation-proof,
the leader’s expectations are realized and his choice guarantees the maximum
level of profits consistent with his expectations.
The solution of the game under the above sequence of decisions is given in
the following proposition:
Proposition 4 In a sequential ‘type-quantity’ game, where the leader’s deci-
sions on type and quantity precede the type and quantity decisions of the follow-
ers, the subgame perfect equilibria are characterized as follows:(a) if m = 2 and
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m = 3, two equilibria exist, both with a PM leader, with k = 2 or k = 1; (b) if
m ≥ 4, three equilibria exist, two with a PM leader, with k = 0 or k = 1 and
one with a RPM leader, with k = 2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Therefore, the equilibria of this game may be characterized by heterogeneity
in behavioral rules not only between leader and followers, but also, and more
significantly, among followers.
5 The heterogeneity in behavioral rules: a com-
ment
The last case analyzed in the previous section is of particular interest: in that
game, heterogeneity in followers’ behavior does not simply rely upon the prop-
erty that RPM agents realize positive profits if at least one PM agent exists.
Heterogeneity of followers may occur in many circumstances, in which the al-
ternative is not the simple zero-profit outcome. If the number of followers is
equal to three, for example, the equilibria are characterized by a PM leader and
a partition of followers, with two of them choosing one type and one choosing
the other type. Why is it that heterogeneous partitions of identical agents turn
out to be stable? What we have to explain is why the lack of incentives for a,
say, RPM agent to move into the PM group may coexist with the incentives of
a PM agent to stick to its type. The only possibility for this to occur is that
the decision of an agent to unilaterally deviate from one group to the other
significantly alters the payoﬀ of any agent of the destination group.
More formally, heterogeneity is a deviation-proof equilibrium if two condi-
tions are satisfied:
πi > πdj
πj > πDi
where the first inequality states that there is no incentive to deviate from PM
to a RPM behavior, and the second excludes the incentive to move in the op-
posite direction. Notice that we use a generic notation for profits to nest all
cases discussed above. For these two inequalities to be simultaneously met, the
values of πi and πDi must be suﬃciently diﬀerent, and the same must hold for
πj and πdj . Indeed, should πi ≈ πDi and πj ≈ πdj , then the above inequalities
would yield πi > πdj ≈ πj and πj > πDi ≈ πi, with an obvious inconsistency.
Therefore, in our set-up explaining behavioral heterogeneity amounts to iden-
tifying the conditions under which unilateral deviations from one type to the
other cause suﬃciently large changes of the individual payoﬀ of the latter. To
this purpose, two key elements must be considered. The first is the total num-
ber of agents: if the number of agents is high, the impact of individual choices
on aggregate variables is relatively low; it is therefore unlikely that a unilateral
deviation might alter significantly the rivals’ payoﬀs. The second element is the
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reaction of the other agents to the deviating behavior. The deviation occurs at
the type-stage; therefore, it is observed, and taken into account, by all the firms
setting their quantities after its implementation. In a strategic substitutability
environment, the rivals partially compensate the quantity implications of any
change of type, by moving in the opposite direction. The stronger this compen-
sation, the smaller the impact of the deviation on aggregate variables and on
the rivals’ payoﬀs. The stability of heterogeneous partitions of agents depends
on the interplay of these two factors.
In particular, in our model we observe heterogeneity of followers (with a
PM leader) only in the framework of the game of Proposition 4, in which the
leader is locked in his quantity decisions, which take place before the followers’
choice of type. Indeed, when all agents, included the PM leader, observe the
hypothetical deviation and take it into account at the quantity-stage, the only
stable partition entails homogeneity of the followers (Proposition 2). Moreover,
we obtain a more articulated pattern of heterogeneity when the number of agents
in the above set-up is small (two or three): this is a clear example of a game
in which on the one side a unilateral decision to change the behavioral rule
has a relevant impact on the rivals’ payoﬀs, on the other side the assumed
time-sequence of moves does not allow, at the quantity stage, for a suﬃcient
compensation of the eﬀects of the deviation.
Finally, notice that similar considerations also apply to the cases in which
the deviation of the unique PM agent active in the market would bring to zero
the profits of the rival RPM agents (Proposition 1 and Proposition 3): the
diﬀerence between πj and πdj = 0 is so high to support this peculiar kind of
heterogeneity.
6 Conclusions
This paper shows that in a strategic environment behavioral heterogeneity can
be an equilibrium outcome of the interaction of profit maximizing agents. In
particular, we have shown that this kind of heterogeneity can be a stable con-
figuration of a market in which identical, profit-concerned agents are allowed
to strategically choose the behavioral rule they will follow at the market stage.
Though all agents have an ultimate objective in terms of profits, partitions in
which at the market stage some of them behave as profit maximizers and others
as relative profit maximizers turn out to be equilibria, in the sense that no agent
perceives the incentive to change his behavioral rule.
Our analysis goes beyond the investigation of rational motives for ‘irrational
behavior’, and it goes beyond the evaluation of the performance of diﬀerent
behavioral rules. It represents a first attempt to trace back behavioral hetero-
geneity into the individual incentives perceived by rational agents in a strategic
environment. In our microfoundation of heterogeneity, both the properties of
the relative performance maximization and the sequence of decisions play a
crucial role. However, we believe that the basic mechanism supporting the het-
erogeneity result could be exploited also in diﬀerent set-ups, relying on the key
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idea that the stability of a heterogeneous partition of agents requires that indi-
vidual deviations from one group to the other produce (relatively) large changes
in the payoﬀs of the destination group. A deeper investigation of the robustness
of this analysis to diﬀerent strategic environments is left to future research.
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Appendix
The proof of Proposition 4 is developed in two steps. We first assume a given
choice of the leader and evaluate the incentives to deviate of the followers; then,
given the followers’ behavior we identify the optimal, rational-expectation choice
of the leader.
Step 1a. Assume that the leader is PM and conjectures a partition of the
followers in k PM and (m− k) RPM. If these conjectures are realized, the
followers’ quantities are given by (5) and (6) and the associated profits by (7)
and (8), all expressed as a function of the quantity of the leader. In order
to check the stability of this partition, we proceed to verify the incentive to
unilateral deviation perceived by the followers. Consider first a RPM follower.
For any given quantity of the leader, should it deviate into a PM firm, it would
earn: eπDi = (q0 (m+ 1)− (a− c) (k + 2))2
(2k +m2 + 3)2
By substituting in the above expression the quantity the leader committed to,
given by (10), we obtain that the profits of a RPM deviating firm are:5
eπDi = 14 (a− c)2 (k + 3)2(2k +m2 + 3)2
It can be checked that eπDi > πj only for k = 0 and m < 4; therefore, we may
conclude that a RPM follower perceives an incentive to unilateral deviation only
in the case in which all followers are RPM and the number of followers is limited
to two or three. Following a similar procedure we can calculate the profits of a
PM deviating follower:
eπdj = 14 (a− c)
2 ¡3k +m (k − 1) + 2m2 − 1¢ (k − 1)
(m+ 1) (2k +m2 − 1)2
In this case the incentive to deviation exhibits a more complicate pattern.
For m = 2 deviation never occurs; for m = 3, eπdj > πi for k = 3, while for
m ≥ 4, eπdj > πi for all k > 1.
We can therefore establish that with a PM leader: (a) if m = 2 or m = 3
two stable partitions of the followers exist, with k = 2 or k = 1; (b) if m ≥ 4,
the two stable partitions entail k = 0 or k = 1.
Step 1b. We turn now to the case of a RPM leader, conjecturing the usual
partition of the followers in k PM and (m− k) RPM. Again we use (5) and
5Notice that eπDi diﬀers from πDi (the profits of a deviating RPM firm used in Propositions
2 and 3) since the sequence of decisions has been significantly altered: now we are assuming
that deviation occurs once the leader’s quantity has already been irrevocably set. While πDi
gives the deviation profits of the follower embodying the quantity adjustment of the leader,eπDi and πj are calculated for the same value of q0.
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(6) for the followers’ quantities and (7) and (8) for their profits. The quantity
produced by the leader is now given by (11). Consider the incentive to deviate
of a RPM follower. Should it deviate into a PM firm, it would earn:
πDi =
(q0 (m+ 1)− (a− c) (k + 2))2
(2k +m2 + 3)2
By substituting in the above expression the quantity already set by the leader,
we obtain the profits of a RPM deviating firm:
πDi =
1
4
(a− c)2
¡
5k + 2k2 + 2m2 + km2
¢2
(2k +m2)2 (2k +m2 + 3)2
The comparison between πDi and bπj shows that for m = 2, a RPM follower
always deviates, since πDi > bπj for k = 0, 1, while for all m > 2, πDi > bπj only
if k = 0. Provided that m > 2, a RPM firm deviates only if all followers are
RPM. By adopting the same procedure, we can show that the profits of a PM
deviating firm are:
πdj =
1
4
(a− c)2
¡
k (2k − 3) +m2 (k − 2)
¢
w
(2k +m2)2 (m+ 1) (2k +m2 − 1)2
where w =
¡
km (2k − 3) + k (6k − 1) +m3 (k − 2) + 7km2 + 2m4
¢
. The com-
parison between πdj and bπi shows that for allm, πdj > bπi only if k > 2. Therefore,
a PM firm does not deviate only if k = 1 and k = 2; for k > 2 a PM firm
always deviates.
We can therefore establish that with a RPM leader, (a) if m = 2 there is
only one stable partition of the followers, with k = 2 ; (b) if m > 2, two stable
partitions of the followers exist, with k = 1 or k = 2.
Step 2. Consider now the choice of the leader. We recall that if the leader’s
expectations are fulfilled, his profits as PM or RPM are given respectively by:
π0 =
1
4
(a− c)2 (k + 1)2
(2k +m2 + 1) (m+ 1) (A1)
bπ0 = 1
4
(a− c)2 k
¡
3k + 2k2 + 2m2 + km2
¢
(2k +m2)2 (m+ 1)
(A2)
Since expectations must be fulfilled at equilibrium, for all m we must exclude
all those partitions which are not deviation-proof for the followers under both
possible choices of the leader. We are therefore left with the following alterna-
tives:
• if m = 2 or m = 3, k = 1 or k = 2;
• if m > 4, k = 0, k = 1 or k = 2.
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However, some of these partitions are deviation-proof only for a given choice of
the leader. In particular:
• if m = 2, k = 1 is an equilibrium only if the leader is PM;
• if m > 4, k = 0 is an equilibrium only if the leader is PM;
• if m > 4, k = 2 is an equilibrium only if the leader is RPM.
In the remaining cases — m = 2 and k = 2; m = 3 and k = 1, 2; m > 4, k = 1
— the leader chooses its type, given his expectations, through a comparison of
(A1) and (A2). In all these cases, π0 > bπ0 so that the leader chooses to be PM.
These results allow us to establish Proposition 4.
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